INSUFFICIENT HEDGE-FUND FRAUD COMPLAINTS AND
MISGUIDED MOTIONS TO DISMISS
JUSTIN DONOHO*
The universe of federal court judgments on motions to dismiss hedge fund fraud complaints
is small but growing. This article examines a cross section of recent cases to extract guidance
applicable to future litigants. The table of contents below summarizes the individual lessons to be
learned from each case or a number of cases, and the text explains these lessons in greater detail,
sometimes suggesting alternative strategies that might prove useful in similar cases. The concluding
section suggests additional lessons stemming from some of the cases’ common themes. Ultimately,
this article mines federal fraud cases brought against hedge funds to suggest how plaintiffs may
fashion a sufficient hedge fund fraud complaint, and how hedge fund defendants may dismiss an
insufficient one.
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I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
Hedge fund companies litigate for a variety of reasons. Like any company,
they litigate disputes with current and former employees, business partners,
attorneys, and trademark infringers. They also litigate disputes specific to the hedge
fund industry. This article investigates a subset of these disputes specific to hedge
funds, particularly those in which hedge funds find themselves defending against
governmental agencies or disgruntled investors. However, the purpose of this article
is not to identify the variety of charges these plaintiffs may bring, which include
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
and professional malpractice, to name a few. Other works identify these numerous
causes of action while citing exemplary cases. 1 This article, by contrast, looks only at
fraud cases, the most common type of allegation, with a focus on the nature of
pleadings sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
In fraud cases, hedge fund companies must address issues distinct from those
presented against investment vehicles that, unlike hedge funds, must register under
the Investment Company Act. 2 And whereas few cases were brought against hedge
fund companies before the new millennium, the number of fraud cases against these
companies has recently grown. 3
Legal scholarship has not yet analyzed the ability of hedge fund companies to
dismiss federal fraud cases at the pleading stage. This article is intended to improve
courtroom efficiency by providing a roadmap for litigants to assist them in bringing a
proper fraud complaint or in determining whether to bring a complaint at all. By the
same token, this article‟s purpose is to provide guidance to hedge fund companies
seeking to dismiss meritless fraud suits quickly.
The analysis proceeds in two parts. Section II briefly summarizes the
applicable legislation and case law regarding motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
as well as pleading requirements in fraud cases. This section also notes nuances of
the applicable law as it concerns hedge fund defendants. Section III surveys the
various types of fraud cases brought against hedge fund companies in federal court,
and examines how the pleadings have been analyzed for sufficiency. The section is
organized according to the major mistakes made by losing litigants in each case. By
See, e.g., Howard S. Meyers, Hedge Fund Liability: Causes of Action against Managers, Advisers, 241 N.Y.
L.J. 4 (2009).
1

See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (2009) (requiring investment companies to register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission).
2

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‟n, Div. of Inv. Mgmt. & Office of Compliance Inspections &
Examinations, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, 72-75 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ hedgefunds0903.pdf.
3
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“mistakes,” this article does not mean to suggest either malpractice on the part of the
attorneys or even that an alternative winning strategy was necessarily available, but
rather pitfalls future litigants should avoid based on the past cases examined. Section
IV concludes the article by summarizing the individual lessons learned and
suggesting additional lessons stemming from some of the cases‟ common themes.
Ultimately, this article mines the universe of federal fraud cases brought against
hedge funds to suggest how to fashion a sufficient hedge fund fraud complaint and
how to dismiss an insufficient one.
II. A P P L I C A BL E L A W
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts accept as true the
complaint‟s factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‟s
favor.4 Nonetheless, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to . . . nudge[ ] [his or
her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 5
While the federal pleading rules usually require plaintiffs to make only “a
short and plain statement” of the claim for relief, 6 Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to
plead complaints of fraud “with particularity.” 7 In the context of securities fraud
complaints, the PSLRA8 clarifies that Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to “„specify‟ each
misleading statement[,] . . . set forth the facts „on which [a] belief‟ that a statement is
misleading was „formed[,]‟ . . . and . . . „state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.‟” 9 State of
mind, or scienter, can be pled by alleging facts either showing motive and
opportunity or constituting strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior
or recklessness. 10
This much is apparent from the first few paragraphs of discussion in any
securities fraud case. However, the black letter law on securities fraud pleading
4

FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Commentary (2009).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009).
5

6

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (2009).

7

FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (2009).

8

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2009).

9

Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (2009)).

ATSI Commc‟ns v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2007). See also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 309-10 (2007) (finding that ultimately a complaint sufficiently
alleges state of mind or scienter when “a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter
cogent and at least as compelling as any plausible opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged”).
10
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standards contains several nuances that must be understood before proceeding with
the analysis below. First, Rule 9(b)‟s and the PSLRA‟s heightened pleading standards
apply only to the facts that the SEC and a private plaintiff must both prove under
Rule 10b-5 to win a securities fraud case—a fraudulent act in connection with the
purchase of securities and scienter. The heightened pleading standard does not
generally apply, however, to additional facts that only a private plaintiff must prove,
including transaction causation, reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission,
economic loss or damages, and loss causation. 11 Thus, in theory, plaintiffs‟
allegations must be particular regarding only the materiality and scienter
requirements.12 For the other requirements—transaction causation, reliance,
damages, and loss causation—plaintiffs need not allege facts with any particularity,
although doing so may help if one wants to establish plausibility rather than mere
conceivability.13
However, some courts also require heightened pleading for the loss causation
element. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court‟s assumption in Dura Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Broudo that for loss causation a plaintiff must meet only Rule 8(a)‟s pleading
standard of fair notice,14 lower courts interpreting Dura are divided on whether loss
causation is one of the circumstances of fraud that must meet the heightened
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).15 In the Second Circuit, for example, unlike in
the Northern District of Illinois,16 plaintiffs must allege “facts sufficient to support
an inference that it was defendant‟s fraud—rather than other salient factors—that
proximately caused plaintiff‟s loss.” 17 This requirement allows defendants to provide
alternative “salient” loss causation theories, which courts may require a plaintiff to
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761, 768 (2008) (outlining the
elements of a private cause of action); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (imposing heightened pleading
requirements only to the elements of materiality and scienter).
11

12

See Dura, 544 U.S. at 345.

13

See Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. at 768; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).

14

Dura, 544 U.S. at 347.

See Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securities Litigators Need to Know, 62 BUS.
LAW. 1281, 1341-42 nn.378-79 (2007) (citing myriad cases indicating a circuit split); Madge S.
Thorsen, Richard A. Kaplan & Scott Hakala, Rediscovering the Economics of Loss Causation, 6 J. BUS. &
SEC. L. 93, 124 (2006) (concluding that “[a]lthough the Court [in Dura] did not hold that loss
causation must be pled with particularity, it seems evident that particularity is one protection against
dismissal. . . . Simply put, if it can be pled, it should be.”).
15

See, e.g., Ong v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 459 F. Supp. 2d 729, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Defendants have
cited no authority suggesting that Dura imposes . . . heightened pleading requirements, and this court
can locate none. The court thus concludes that Plaintiffs in this case are not required to plead facts
showing economic loss or causation.”).
16

17

Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
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rebut at the 12(b)(6) stage. 18 Thus, just as loss causation has become an issue to be
resolved factually with competing experts at the class certification stage in some
courts,19 loss causation is also becoming ripe for resolution on motions to dismiss.
Second, the reach of the “plausibility” standard, enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly 20 and extended in Ashcroft v. Iqbal to “all
civil actions,”21 remains largely untested outside the antitrust and qualified immunity
contexts of those cases.22 Creative plaintiffs in the context of securities fraud thus
have room to argue what constitutes plausibility with respect to the final four
elements of a securities fraud claim not subject to Rule 9(b)‟s heightened pleading
standard, subject to the court division noted above regarding the element of loss
causation.
Third, most fraud suits against hedge funds proceed under SEC Rule 10b-5
promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.23 But hedge funds,
by nature, find themselves defending against a variety of types of 10b-5 fraud suits.
One type, for example, involves a claim of market manipulation, which rests not on
false statements or omissions, but on deceptive or manipulative acts. 24 In some cases
of market manipulation, “the level of specificity required by Rule 9(b) is somewhat
relaxed.”25 Indeed, the variety of types of fraud cases brought against hedge funds
under Rule 10b-5, explored below, underlies the complexity of what constitutes a
sufficient pleading. Adding to this complexity are fraud cases brought against hedge

See, e.g., Catogas v. Cyberonics, Inc., 292 F. App‟x. 311, 314-17 (5th Cir. 2008) (dismissing the
complaint because plaintiffs could not allege facts to rebut defendants‟ alternative loss causation
theory).
18

See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 266-67 (5th Cir.
2007).
19

20

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (requiring Twombly‟s plausibility standard in a discrimination suit against
government officials brought by a Muslim Pakistani pretrial detainee).
21

For a discussion of the import of Twombly and Iqbal, see, e.g., Michelle Spiegel, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The
Question of a Heightened Standard of Pleading in Qualified Immunity Cases, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL‟Y SIDEBAR 375 (2009); Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado about Twombly? A Study on the Impact of
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008); J. Douglas
Richards, Three Limitations of Twombly: Antitrust Conspiracy Inferences in a Context of Historical Monopoly, 82
ST. JOHN‟S L. REV. 849 (2008).
22

23

Meyers, supra note 1, at 4.

24

CompuDyne Corp. v. Shane, 453 F. Supp. 2d 807, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

25

Id. (quoting Dietrich v. Bauer, 76 F. Supp. 2d 312, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).

166

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 11

funds under other laws, such as the Commodities Exchange Act 26 or state common
law.27
Finally, defendants have two additional arguments for asserting on a 12(b)(6)
motion that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim: (1) the bespeaks-caution doctrine;
and (2) the statute of limitations defense, each of which has nuances of its own and
is discussed later in this article.
In sum, the law in this area is complex. The next section explores how
courts have applied these complexities in cases against hedge funds and provides a
critical analysis of challenging the sufficiency of pleadings.
III. C A S E S T U D I ES
The universe of federal fraud cases in which hedge fund defendants have
moved to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is small
but growing. 28 Hedge funds today face an increasing number of disgruntled
investors and regulators. This section analyzes these cases to provide litigants with
lessons learned. Each subheading corresponds with the losing litigant‟s ultimate
mistake, and the discussion under some subheadings also recounts specific winning
and losing arguments to consider in future similar cases.
A. P lai nti ffs ’ Mi s takes
1. Conclusory Complaints
One way a plaintiff can fail to state a claim under 12(b)(6), as detailed above,
is by making legal conclusions without providing enough facts to support the
conclusions as plausible. The following four cases illustrate different ways plaintiffs
have mistakenly crafted conclusory complaints and how defendant hedge funds have
disposed of those complaints with a motion to dismiss.
a) Alleging alter egos. In Cafaro v. HMC,29 the plaintiffs alleged that the HMC
fund fabricated statements to investors in its monthly account statements by
indicating fictitious profits, and that defendant fund Essex-Morgan shared
responsibility for the fraud because the common owner of HMC and Essex-Morgan
treated the funds as alter egos, as evidenced by the owner‟s transfer of $450,000
26

7 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2009).

27

See, e.g., CompuDyne, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 831-32.

A search in Westlaw‟s “All Federal Courts” database for “hedge fund,” “12(b)(6),” and “fraud”
returned 152 cases. A vast majority of these cases occurred within the last few years, and this section
references several of them to aid in the analysis.
28

29

No. 07-2793 (JLL), 2008 WL 4224801 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2008).
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from Essex-Morgan to HMC. 30 Essex-Morgan moved to dismiss, explaining that the
only transfer the owner made was of his own funds, and that the plaintiffs alleged no
facts inconsistent with Essex-Morgan‟s good faith. 31 The court granted the motion
and noted that the plaintiffs failed to “specify „the who, what, when, where, and
how‟” with respect to the defendant‟s material misrepresentation or scienter. 32
b) Alleging loss causation. The plaintiff was more specific in Collier v. Aksys
Ltd., but failed to state a claim because of his conclusory allegations of loss
causation. 34 The defendant Durus funds accumulated 77 percent of Aksys‟s stock
over nine months, which when revealed alongside Durus‟ intention not to control
Aksys, caused the stock price to drop before eventually rebounding.35 The plaintiff,
a short seller, claimed that he lost money by covering his short position the day
before the press release caused the drop.36 Had he only waited an extra day! But the
plaintiff‟s failure to hold his short position longer was irrelevant; the court explained
that he needed to establish loss causation during the actual short selling period. 37 In
an attempt to do so, he asserted that the stock price would have been high from the
beginning of the period, as opposed to rising throughout the period, had Durus
disclosed its true intent to concentrate ownership.38 But the court explained that the
fund‟s true intentions, once revealed, in fact caused a precipitous decline, and thus
any alleged material misrepresentations or omissions could not have caused the
loss.39 The plaintiff was forced to plead a market manipulation theory, but could do
so only conclusorily.40 He pled no facts to indicate “practices, such as wash sales,
matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially
affecting market activity.” 41 The court criticized the defendants‟ “apparent blatant
disregard for the reporting requirements under the Securities Act of 1934,” but
33

Mem. of Law in Opp‟n to Essex Morgan‟s Mot. to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at
§§ I.A, I.B; see also Cafaro, 2008 WL 4224801 (No. 07-2793 (JLL)).
30

31

See Cafaro, 2008 WL 4224801, at *8, *11.

32

Id. at *7 (quoting In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999)).

33

No. 3:04CV1232(MRK), 2005 WL 1949868 (D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2005).

34

Id. at *6.

35

Id. at *4, *6.

36

Id. at *3-*4.

37

Id. at *13.

38

Id. at *11-*12.

39

Id. at *15.

40

Id. at *14, *16.

41

Id. at *15 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977)).
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explained that misrepresentation alone cannot sustain a market manipulation claim
under Rule 10b-5.42
The plaintiff in Collier claimed next that he lost money by covering his short
position months after the price had rebounded.43 The court also dismissed this claim
as conclusory, noting that the plaintiff‟s cover purchases were “far too removed in
time to be causally linked” to misrepresentations revealed months earlier. 44 The
plaintiff alleged no facts that would allow the court to infer that the changed price
was a result of “not the earlier misrepresentation[s], but changed economic
circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific
facts, conditions, or other events.” 45
c) Alleging material misrepresentation. The plaintiffs in Edison Fund v. Cogent
Investment Strategies Fund, Ltd.,46 by contrast, did not state enough facts for the court to
infer even a material misrepresentation. 47 The defendant fund‟s investment strategy
focused on a managed portfolio of insured subprime automobile finance loans.” 48
The fund had generally been able to arrange sales of loan portfolios to credit unions
to meet the liquidity requirements of its customers.49 After the market for managed
portfolios of subprime automobile finance loans deteriorated, however, the fund was
unable to redeem the plaintiffs‟ investment. 50 The plaintiffs alleged fraud, claiming
that the defendant should have concluded, based on its “superior knowledge of
credit union practices[,] . . . that the investment yield targets and liquidity
representations set forth in the offering memoranda were impossible to achieve.” 51
As evidence, the plaintiffs cited letters issued by the National Credit Union
Association (“NCUA”) in 2001 and 2004 that urged credit unions to perform due
diligence and ongoing monitoring of “alternative financing” arrangements such as

42

Id. at *16.

43

See id. at *3.

44

Id. at *13.

45

Id. at *10 (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 343).

46

551 F. Supp. 2d 210, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

However, the plaintiffs were successful in this case with respect to a different fund. See discussion
infra Part III.B.5; see also Lakonia Mgmt. Ltd. v. Meriwether, 106 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557-58 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (dismissing a civil RICO claim for failure to allege with particularity material misrepresentations,
omissions, or any other deceitful conduct).
47

48

Edison Fund, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 217.

49

Id. at 218.

50

Id. at 230.

51

Id. at 221.
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subprime lending through third-party providers.52 The court found these letters
insufficient to show misrepresentations about whether credit unions provided a
viable origination source and secondary market for loans because the letters‟
accompanying positive statements showed that they “did not serve as a directive to
credit unions to stop this type of lending.” 53 In short, “the plaintiffs allege[d] no
facts to show that . . . the defendants had reason to believe that „the credit union
market was retrenching due to the NCUA‟s actions.” 54
Not only did the plaintiffs provide no basis for concluding that the offering
memoranda were fraudulent, they also were adequately warned of risks under the
bespeaks-caution doctrine.55 As the court explained, the offering memoranda
“warned investors that the Funds were appropriate only for sophisticated investors
and carried risks—in particular, risks of the illiquidity of the investments.” 56
Consequently, “in light of the cautionary language, no reasonable investor could have
concluded that the risks of the possible illiquidity of the investments and a risk of
loss of capital due to a number of factors, including the tightening of the secondary
market, did not exist.”57
d) Treating discretionary valuations as gospel. A special sort of conclusory claim
was presented in Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Management LLC.58 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant hedge fund managers intentionally inflated the
net asset values (“NAVs”) of the fund‟s investment portfolio to prevent existing
investors from seeking to redeem their investments and to induce new investors. 59
The funds involved non-exchange-listed securities, whose valuation differed
“depending on the model used in the calculations” and “was not a matter of looking
up closing prices in the Wall Street Journal, but involved the exercise of judgment.” 60
The court found the plaintiffs‟ allegations conclusory, because they did not allege
with particularity either “that the models used or the judgments made by [the
plaintiffs‟ experts] were superior to those used or made by [the fund],” or “that the
52

Id. at 219.

53

Id. at 222.

Id. at 223 (quoting First Am. Compl. at ¶ 45, Edison Fund, 551 F. Supp. 2d 210 (No. 06 Civ. 4045
(JGK))).
54

55

Id. at 221.

56

Id. at 223.

57

Id. at 224.

58

376 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

59

Id. at 390-91, 394.

Id. at 396 (quoting Alteram S.A. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC, No. 03 Civ. 2387(LAK), 2004
WL 367709, at *2 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2004)).
60
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alleged differences in valuations were outside the range of what is considered normal
in the industry.”61 For a particular range of dates, however, the plaintiffs did allege
facts showing that the fund managers were self-dealing.62 During this period, the
plaintiffs stated sufficient facts to state a claim of fraud based on overstatement of
the NAVs, but outside this period the plaintiffs‟ allegations were too conclusory to
sustain a claim.63
In sum, plaintiffs cannot withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
by making conclusory claims. The insufficient complaints examined here were
conclusory because they averred (1) only that a defendant fund is the alter ego of a
different fund against which the plaintiff‟s allegations state a claim; (2) market
manipulation based only on misrepresentations, but no economic facts indicating
loss causation; (3) losses too removed in time from misrepresentations to imply loss
causation; (4) material misrepresentations without facts to show any
misrepresentations; and (5) abuse of discretion in valuing assets without supporting
data or circumstantial evidence.
2. Unnecessary Delay
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, fraud complaints under Rule
10b-5 must be filed within two years of discovering facts constituting the alleged
violation.64 Discovery includes not only actual notice, but also constructive or
inquiry notice.65 A duty of inquiry arises when “storm warnings” would suggest to
an investor of ordinary intelligence that she has probably been defrauded. 66
In Ennis v. Montemayor,67 for example, the plaintiffs‟ fraud claim was barred
because the plaintiffs failed to investigate the claim within the limitations period,
which began running when the hedge fund sent notice of 91-percent losses and an
admission of its “failure to adhere to tenets of our basic philosophy.” 68 As the court
61

Id.

62

Id. at 396-97.

63

Id. at 397.

28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2009). Additionally, complaints may be brought within five years of the
alleged violation absent this discovery. Id.
64

GVA Mkt. Neutral Master Ltd. v. Veras Capital Partners Offshore Fund, Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 2d 321,
327 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
65

Id.; see also In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litigation, 543 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir.
2008), cert. granted 129 S.Ct. 2432 (May 26, 2009) (No. 08-905) (identifying a circuit split regarding the
employment of this test).
66

67

14 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

68

Id. at 386-87 (emphasis omitted).
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explained, this notice constituted sufficient “storm warnings,” and the plaintiffs had
“no justifiable reason . . . for . . . delay in bringing suit.” 69
Application of the statute of limitations was less straightforward in GVA
Market Neutral Master Ltd. v. Veras Capital Partners Offshore Fund, Ltd. 70 On the one
hand, “numerous news articles, press releases, and lawsuits appeared containing the
exact allegations of wrongdoing” that the plaintiff alleged in its complaint, and the
plaintiff admitted actually suspecting that the defendant hedge fund had engaged in
fraudulent market timing and illegal late trading. 71 But the plaintiff claimed that it
had performed its inquiry and had been assured by the hedge fund that it had not
acted illegally.72 The court found this argument unconvincing, noting that the fund‟s
outright denials “do not fulfill [the plaintiff‟s] duty of inquiry and were insufficient to
toll the running of the statute of limitations.”73 The outcome might be different in
another case, but in GVA Market the court found dispositive “the volume and
nature of the information available” to the plaintiff, as well as the plaintiff‟s
sophistication.74
3. Failure to Do the Math First
Plaintiffs may present well-pleaded and potentially meritorious claims but
nevertheless have their case dismissed as premature for failure to sue first for an
accounting. Dismissal for prematurity occurs when the investor suing the hedge
fund is also a partner in the fund. In Drenis v. Haligiannis,75 limited partners in a
hedge fund adequately pled fraudulent conveyance but had their claims dismissed for
failure to sue first for an accounting; however, the court recognized that “in recent
years the accounting rule has fallen into relative disrepute.”76 Whether an accounting
is required before a partner files suit against a hedge fund depends on the state law
being applied.77

69

Id. at 387-88.

70

580 F. Supp. 2d at 321.

71

Id. at 325, 329.

72

Id. at 331.

73

Id. at 332.

74

Id.

75

452 F. Supp. 2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

76

Id. at 432.

77

Id. at 430.
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B . De fe ndants ’ Mi s takes
Thus far this article has explored ways a plaintiff can fail to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). But hedge funds invoking Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss fraud
complaints against them can often be unsuccessful. This section discusses these
misguided motions to dismiss and, in some cases, draws lessons from the analysis
above concerning insufficient complaints to provide alternative strategies that may
prove more successful in future similar cases.
1. Debating Facts
S.E.C. v. Seaforth Meridian, Ltd.78 presents the paradigm of a sufficient fraud
complaint and of a hedge fund‟s misguided motion to dismiss. The SEC alleged that
the fund‟s principals misrepresented the fund‟s strategy and operations in its primary
offering document or private placement memorandum (“PPM”).79 To support this
allegation, the SEC‟s complaint detailed the PPM‟s assurance that the fund‟s strategy
was to achieve “growth of capital and production of income” by purchasing fixedincome bonds and securities of medium to large capitalized companies. 80 The
complaint explained that these were misrepresentations, because the fund invested in
“two suspect offshore funds with no verifiable history of paying monthly returns,
generating growth of capital, or production of income,” and furthermore that the
defendant “could not furnish any evidence that [these offshore funds] purchased
fixed-income bonds or legitimate recognized securit[ies].”81 The complaint also
noted the PPM‟s commitment to undertake due diligence regarding prospective
investments, which the fund must not have performed, because “any real and
meaningful due diligence would have shown that the person behind [one of the
offshore funds] was actually a recidivist fraudster permanently banned by the FSA.” 82
The complaint also discussed the PPM‟s nondiscretionary revenue sharing plan and
an alleged $600,000 of undisclosed kickbacks to the fund‟s general partner, which
was inconsistent with the plan because the fund‟s investment “never demonstrated
actual income or revenue.” 83 These enumerations in the complaint all explained the
SEC‟s first allegation that the fund misrepresented its strategy and operations.

78

No. 06-4107-RDR, 2006 WL 3702091 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 2006).

79

Compl. at ¶¶ 27-28, Seaforth Meridian, 2006 WL 3694864 (No. 06-4107-RDR).

80

Id.
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Id.
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Id. at ¶ 30.
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Id. at ¶ 29.
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Second, the SEC alleged that the fund misrepresented the credentials and
roles of its principals in the PPM by (1) touting principal Tucker‟s experience but
failing to disclose that he was sued by the SEC under the name Klion for defrauding
investors; (2) explaining the fund‟s unawareness of pending litigation against its
principals although principal Assemi was facing litigation for investment fraud; (3)
failing to disclose Assemi‟s important conflict of interest—that he was a managing
director of one of the offshore funds; and (4) touting the involvement of three
principals in performing due diligence before investing, when the other two
principals in reality deferred to Assemi.84
Finally, the SEC alleged that the fund made false reports of positive returns.
Specifically, the fund “sent to investors false and misleading monthly account
statements and newsletters showing supposed profits and emphasizing the safety of
the investors‟ principal” although it “had no financial basis for determining the assets
or profits” of the fund.85 Moreover, in addition to the alleged kickbacks, the
complaint alleged that the defendants could not or had refused to explain the
disappearance of $13.5 million sent to the offshore funds. 86
The defendants moved to dismiss, providing 1,500 pages of exhibits, 1,250
of which consisted of tax returns.87 This monstrous motion only debated the facts,
rather than interpreting them for the court or addressing any shortcomings in the
complaint. For example, the defendants argued that the SEC‟s characterization of
the $600,000 as a kickback was “not correct,” and explained how other facts in the
PPM indicated that the $600,000, contrary to the SEC‟s assertion, was a management
fee.88 The right strategy on a 12(b)(6) motion, however, is not to contradict the
alleged facts, but to argue that they do not state a claim. So here the defendants
should have argued that the SEC‟s description of a $600,000 “kickback” in the face
of no returns actually alleged nothing more than a typical management fee in the hedge
fund industry, and that the SEC failed to allege with particularity any facts, such as
those in the PPM, that would indicate fraudulent motive, given that a typical
management fee is not enough to provide motive for fraud. 89 The defendants might
84

Id. at ¶ 31.

85

Id.

86

Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.

Resp. Br. Opposing Mot. to Dismiss of Assemi, Clyman, and Friedrich at § V(C), Seaforth Meridian,
2006 WL 3702091 (No. 06-4107-RDR).
87

Mem. of Law in Supp. of Clyman‟s Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. with Prejudice at § 2, Seaforth
Meridian, 2006 WL 3702091 (No. 06-4107-RDR).
88

The Southern District of New York is divided on whether management fees alone provide
sufficient circumstantial evidence of fraudulent motive. See Heller v. Goldin Restructuring Fund, L.P.,
590 F. Supp. 2d 603, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting the split and citing cases); see also Edison Fund v.
Cogent Inv. Strategies Fund, 551 F. Supp. 2d 210, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
89
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not have been able to avoid other alleged facts showing motive, opportunity, and
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness, in which case a
12(b)(6) motion was the improper procedure for making their arguments. But at
least taking a non-contradictory method of interpretation tied to elements of the
offense would have engaged the court in analyzing any deficiencies in the complaint.
Instead, the court denied the motion summarily, noting only that “the complaint
here clearly reveals that plaintiff has adequately set forth sufficient claims and facts to
overcome a motion to dismiss.” 90
The defendants‟ contradictory approach also failed in CompuDyne Corp. v.
Shane.91 The plaintiffs alleged that a hedge fund shorted the stock it later purchased
in a private investment in public equity (“PIPE”) offering, thereby manipulating the
market and reducing the price it paid in the PIPE transaction, despite that the PIPE
purchase agreement unequivocally prohibited any trading in CompuDyne stock. 92
The plaintiffs also provided details of the short sales, including dates and prices.93
The court found that this was enough to state a claim. 94 It began by noting that for
market manipulation claims, “the level of specificity required by Rule 9(b) is
somewhat relaxed.” 95 The court then had no trouble concluding that the plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged a “scheme to defraud Plaintiffs into selling them shares on the
PIPE and to manipulate the market in CompuDyne stock by artificially depressing
and/or increasing the volatility of CompuDyne stock prior to the pricing of the
PIPE.”96
The defendants contested that their illegal short selling before the pricing of
the PIPE was only “moderate [and thus] could not have negatively affected the
market price of CompuDyne stock,” and that their cover of the short sales before
agreeing to the PIPE price neutralized any effect of the short selling. 97 In effect, the
defendants contested loss causation, but offered neither an alternative salient
explanation for the plaintiffs‟ losses nor an economic analysis proving the
impossibility of causing plaintiffs‟ losses (see further discussion about the
impossibility defense in section II.B.4 below). Had they done either, they might have
been able to credibly assert that the plaintiffs alleged no facts to indicate loss
90

Seaforth Meridian, 2006 WL 3702091, at *3.

91

453 F. Supp. 2d 807, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

92

Id. at 821-22, 824.

93

Id. at 815.

94

Id. at 823.

95

Id. at 821.
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Id. at 828.

97

Id.
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causation. We saw above in the Collier case, for example, that this approach of
challenging the plaintiffs’ allegations as conclusory with convincing economic
evidence was successful in supporting a motion to dismiss. Without such evidence,
however, the court found the defendants’ contentions “conclusory and contrary” to
the plaintiffs‟ allegations, and denied the motion to dismiss without further
discussion.98
2. Raising Irrelevancies
Some motions to dismiss do not attempt to debate facts as described above,
but nevertheless are summarily dismissed for failure to show any legal deficiency in
the complaint. In S.E.C. v. Lydia Capital, LLC, 99 the defendant argued “that the
Amended Complaint should be dismissed as against him because even if the SEC
prevails on the merits, there are no assets of his within the SEC‟s reach.” 100 The
court denied the motion without further discussion except to note that a fraudulent
scheme had been alleged with requisite detail, that the SEC‟s inability to reach the
defendant‟s assets in the UK was relevant only to settlement discussions, and that the
SEC would be wise to reconsider accepting the defendant‟s settlement offer. 101
Defendants also failed to note the legal insufficiency of the allegations against
them in S.E.C. v. Colonial Investment Management LLC. 102 The SEC alleged that the
defendants engaged in conduct that violated a previous version of Rule 105. Since
the previous version had been superseded, the defendants argued that “the Amended
Complaint fail[ed] to allege any violations of Rule 105 in its current form.” 103 But the
new version of Rule 105 had actually been broadened to be less favorable to
defendants.104 Thus the court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that a
“willingness to violate the prior version of Rule 105 may be some evidence of a
willingness to violate the rule in its revised form.” 105 These examples show that
courts deny motions to dismiss that present issues wholly irrelevant to the sufficiency
of a fraud claim.
98

Id.

99

No. 07-10712-RGS, 2008 WL 509136 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2008).

100

Id. at *1.
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Id. at *2.
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No. 07 Civ. 8849(PKC), 2008 WL 2191764 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2008).
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Id. at *2.

Id. at *1-*2. The current rule prohibits all buyers with short positions from purchasing a security in
a registered offering. Previously, the prohibition was restricted only to buyers who had covered their
short positions. Id.
104

105

Id. at *4.
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3. Ignoring Contract Provisions
While the above motions to dismiss failed to challenge the fraud claim‟s
sufficiency, and thus were dismissed summarily, other losing motions to dismiss
directly address the fraud claim‟s sufficiency and manage to engage the court in
analysis. For example, the defendants forced the court to more closely analyze the
complaint in Heller v. Goldin Restructuring Fund, L.P.,106 in which both sides presented
creative arguments regarding the complaint‟s sufficiency. Ultimately, however, the
defendants‟ fraud defense was doomed by a provision in the offering
memorandum. 107
The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendant hedge fund (1)
failed to disclose its ability to raise only $40 million of the intended $200 million of
capital commitments it needed to invest in the promised diversified portfolio of eight
to twelve underperforming middle-market companies; (2) misrepresented that a
prominent investor and businessman had committed approximately $40 million to
the fund; (3) misled the plaintiff into the necessity of investing immediately, when
the fund would remain open to new capital commitments for another nine to twelve
months; and (4) disclosed the fund‟s undercapitalization only after it had lost over
$400,000 of the plaintiff‟s capital due to the fund‟s investment in a single venture.108
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to
sufficiently plead three of the necessary elements of a fraud claim. 109 First, the
defendants challenged the misrepresentations‟ materiality. They argued that the
plaintiff showed no facts indicating that “a reasonable investor would have viewed
[the misrepresentations] as significantly altering the „total mix‟ of information
available.”110 Instead, the plaintiff alleged only an oral misrepresentation concerning
the fund‟s targeted $200 million capitalization and goal of achieving portfolio
diversification.111 But the subscription agreement with the plaintiff, the defendants
argued, contractually waived any reliance on oral statements. 112 Oral statements of
best-case scenarios were immaterial, because any reasonable plaintiff would have
known that he was making a risky, non-diversified investment based on the
documents—the only materials a reasonable investor would have relied upon given
106

590 F. Supp. 2d 603, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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Id. at 615.

Compl. for Fed. Sec. Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty at ¶¶ 40, 42, 53, 54, 68, 70, Heller, 590
F.Supp.2d 603 (No. 07 CIV. 3704 (RJS)).
108

109

Heller, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
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Id. at 614 (citing the test of materiality stated in S.E.C. v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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Id.
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Id. at 614-15.

2009]

INSUFFICIENT HEDGE FUND FRAUD COMPLAINTS

177

the contractual waiver. The plaintiffs thus showed no facts to indicate materiality of
the oral misrepresentations, or so the defendants argued.
This argument would have carried the day had the subscription agreement
actually waived any reliance on oral representations. 113 But the subscription
agreement allowed the investor plaintiff to rely not only on the written documents he
had been provided, but also on “independent investigations made by the
Investor.” 114 Oral representations conveyed to the plaintiff fit within this category,
and hence the fund‟s best legal argument collapsed.
In an attempt to revive its argument, the fund cited the bespeaks-caution
doctrine, which allows a court to nevertheless find a misrepresentation immaterial if
a reasonable investor would consider certain offending statements or omissions
insignificant in light of all the disclosures made. 115 In essence, the doctrine “is a
reformulation of the „reasonable investor‟ standard of materiality.” 116 The court
explained that the bespeaks-caution doctrine may exonerate hedge fund defendants
from allegations of fraud due to “failure to disclose the risks generally associated
with securities investments.” 117 But the “doctrine does not apply where the specific
risk [severe undercapitalization in this case] is apparent and not disclosed.”118 As the
court analogized, given the defendants‟ assurances that the plaintiff had far
outdistanced the Grand Canyon when actually he was skirting the brink—oral
misrepresentations upon which the plaintiff was contractually entitled to rely—the
defendants could not disclaim the materiality of these assertions simply by “warn[ing]
[their] hiking companion to go slowly.” 119
Having lost the materiality argument due to the contract provision, the
defendants‟ remaining challenges to the allegations of scienter also were doomed to
fail. Both parties spent much time in their briefs discussing whether the plaintiffs
alleged facts showing motive and opportunity or constituting strong circumstantial

Id. (citing Silva Run Worldwide Ltd. v. Gaming Lottery Corp., No. 96 Civ. 3231(RPP), 2001 WL
396521 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001)); see also Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d
1032, 1057 (Del. Ch. 2006) (discussing the legal implications of a “clear integration clause”).
113
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Heller, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (emphasis omitted).
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Id. at 617.
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Id. at 615.
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Id. at 617-18 (citing Edison Fund, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 226).

Id. at 618 (quoting In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P‟ships Litig., 930 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)).
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evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. 120 The court considered these
arguments carefully, concluding that the plaintiff‟s “inference of scienter is cogent
and at least as compelling as” the defendants‟ opposing inferences, which was all the
plaintiff needed to prove.121 Seemingly fatal to the defendants‟ argument was the
contention that they “were simply seeking to attract investors for their new Fund in
perfectly legitimate ways.” 122 But as the court had previously found, the defendants‟
oral misrepresentations were not “legitimate” absent contractual provisions waiving
the plaintiff‟s reliance on them.123
Finally, the defendants challenged the plaintiff‟s allegations of loss causation,
but chose only to debate the alleged facts, a strategy which, as described in Section
III.B.1 above, is typically unfruitful.124 Yet the defendants might have missed an
opportunity here. The plaintiff contended that his monetary loss was caused by the
foreseeable materialization of the concealed risk of undercapitalization, that is, the
fund‟s “subsequent inability to follow through on its investment strategy of obtaining
a diverse portfolio of eight to twelve „distressed‟ companies,” which led to a highrisk, lost investment in only one company. 125 The defendants denied loss causation,
classifying the single-venture investment loss as “an intervening event impacting the
Fund‟s ability to achieve its final capital commitment target and its ultimate
success.” 126 But this classification of the failed initial investment as an intervening
act presupposed that the defendants could invest in a diverse portfolio piecemeal,
whereas the plaintiff alleged a counterfactual stated objective by the defendants to
invest in a diverse portfolio all at once. Hence the defendants only debated the facts
here, albeit indirectly, and in fact devoted little space in the briefs to contesting the
allegations of loss causation.
A more successful argument regarding loss causation might have explained
that the plaintiff provided no facts indicating that “a diverse portfolio of eight to
twelve „distressed‟ companies” would have lost less money than the single-venture
investment in question.127 In a distressed economy causing most diversified
See Compl. for Fed. Sec. Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Heller v. Goldin Restructuring
Fund, L.P., 590 F. Supp. 2d 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 07-cv-3704 (RWS)); Reply in Supp. of Defs.‟
Mot. to Dismiss, Heller, 590 F. Supp. 2d 603 (No. 07 Civ. 3704 (RJS)).
120
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Heller, 590 F. Supp. 2d. at 623 (emphasis in original).
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Reply in Supp. of Defs‟ Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 120, at § II.A.

Heller, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 623 (finding “most significant” the defendants‟ behavior, which would
have been irrelevant to the analysis had plaintiffs waived reliance on oral representations).
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Id.
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Id. at 624; Compl., supra note 120, at ¶¶ 5-6.
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Reply in Supp. of Defs‟ Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 120, at § II.B.
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portfolios to decline, the plaintiff might have lost as much or more money even had
the fund been sufficiently capitalized and diversified. The plaintiff alleged no facts indicating
that the fund would have outperformed any of the myriad money-losing funds
whose diversifications were broader than the defendants‟ alleged objective. Stated
this way, the defendants might have pointed to the lack of sufficient allegations to
show loss causation, and they might have buttressed the point with economic data.
Certainly the defendants could have found room in their briefs by removing the
previously discussed arguments rendered moot by the faulty contract provision.
A court also denied a motion to dismiss due to an ignored alleged contract
provision in S.E.C. v. Lyon.128 The SEC alleged that the defendants engaged in
insider trading in violation of the Securities Act. The defendants challenged the
sufficiency of the claim, arguing that the SEC alleged no facts to indicate that the
defendants were bound by a duty of confidentiality when they took short positions
in the PIPE issuers‟ publicly traded stock. 129 In so arguing, the defendants ignored
the SEC‟s allegations that they had signed confidentiality agreements. Instead they
contended that their receipt of documents containing confidentiality clauses in
connection with the concerned PIPE offerings did not establish that they were
bound by a duty of confidentiality with respect to those offerings.130 The court
found that this was an issue of fact for trial, depending on discovery of possible oral
communications and customary practice. 131 Because the SEC was able to point to
written documents containing clauses indicating a duty of confidentiality, it had
“state[d] with particularity a plausible claim for the existence of such a duty.” 132
4. Failure to Argue Impossibility
In the Amaranth cases, 133 a hedge fund faced charges that it had violated the
Commodity Exchange Act, by attempting to manipulate the price of natural gas
futures contracts in the case brought by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission; and by actually manipulating the price of those contracts in the case
brought by private plaintiffs. In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the hedge
fund, Amaranth, deliberately waited to sell a substantial number of futures on
NYMEX in the final minutes before the close of trading, with intent to cause the
128

529 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (civil claim
brought by private plaintiffs); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‟n v. Amaranth Advisors,
L.L.C., 554 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (civil claim brought by the CFTC).
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price of natural gas futures to decline. 134 Amaranth allegedly did this to profit from
its much larger short positions on over-the-counter natural gas swaps on ICE, which
uses NYMEX settlement prices of natural gas futures to calculate the price of natural
gas swaps.135
At issue in both the attempted manipulation and the actual manipulation
claims was the fund‟s intent to manipulate. In both cases, the defendants who
performed the alleged manipulative acts spent most of their efforts to dismiss the
claim by arguing that the plaintiffs had alleged no facts to show a manipulative
intent.136 Although one court subjected the plaintiff to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)‟s liberal pleading standard, while the other imposed Rule 9(b)‟s
heightened pleading standard, both courts rejected the defendants‟ interpretation of
the facts the plaintiffs alleged, finding the required intent to manipulate at least as
convincing as the defendants‟ alternative explanations based on the timing of the
orders, the conduct of the traders, and Amaranth‟s ICE swap holdings.137
Amaranth might have argued alternatively that manipulation was impossible.
The theory here, were it true, would have been that Amaranth‟s late trading of
futures on NYMEX was so small relative to the natural gas market that it could not
possibly have affected prices. In the actual manipulation case, an element of the
offense was indeed “an ability to influence market prices.” 138 The plaintiffs alleged
no such ability, the defendants neglected to point this out, and the court assumed the
criterion to be satisfied.139 Perhaps it was, but defendants of manipulation claims
have an opportunity to contest via economic evidence their ability to manipulate the
market, or at least to point out that the plaintiffs failed to allege any facts indicating
an ability to manipulate.
In the attempted manipulation case, by contrast, the defendants did point out
that the plaintiffs failed to allege any facts indicating an ability to manipulate. 140 But
in an attempt case, factual impossibility is an affirmative defense, not an element of
the claim.141 The defendants could not shift the burden of pleading without citing
134

In re Amaranth, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 519; C.F.T.C. v. Amaranth, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 525-29.
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In re Amaranth, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 519-25; C.F.T.C. v. Amaranth, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 525-29.
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In re Amaranth, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 539-41; C.F.T.C. v. Amaranth, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 532-33.
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In re Amaranth, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 541; C.F.T.C. v. Amaranth, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 533.

In re Amaranth, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (quoting In re Crude Oil Commodity Litig., No. 06 Civ.
6677(NRB), 2007 WL 1946553, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007)).
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See id. at 530-31.

Def. Hunter‟s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. at § II, C.F.T.C. v. Aramanth,
554 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (No. 07 Civ. 6682 (DC)).
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Given that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged scienter, that is, that the defendants‟ project as they
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any economic evidence supporting their inability to manipulate the market. In both
attempted and actual manipulation cases, then, defendants may potentially find
success by arguing the impossibility of price manipulation if they can support the
assertion with facts.
5. Failure to Stay Current Regarding Risk
In Section II.A.1.c above, we saw that the plaintiff in Edison Fund failed to
state enough facts for the court to infer a material misrepresentation, primarily
because it could not show an apparent risk to the credit union market that the
defendant should have known about when it gave optimistic statements regarding
investment in the market. But the plaintiff also brought another fraud claim in the
same case regarding a different investment, alleging material misrepresentations
occurring after the NCUA had distributed its “June 2005 risk alert.”142 The court
found that this alert “appeared to require corrective action,” unlike the NCUA‟s
previous published letters, which only addressed concerns. 143 Hence the defendant
should have been on notice that its statements to investors were false concerning the
availability of liquidity in the financial institution secondary market to fund
redemption requests. The defendant disagreed, contending that the NCUA‟s risk
alert failed to allege facts “demonstrat[ing] that the representations concerning the
financial institution secondary market were false.” 144 The court found this argument
unpersuasive, in contrast to its holding in the first claim.145 In reviewing both claims,
the court assumed that the defendant had a duty to keep abreast of the risk it
disclaimed in its offering documents. Having failed to stay abreast of the risk and
alter its statements to investors accordingly, the defendants were left hopelessly
debating the facts about the risk alert the plaintiffs alleged. Hence the court denied
the motion to dismiss where the plaintiffs clearly alleged facts, however debatable, to

Jurisdictions differ on whether factual impossibility is a defense to attempted prohibited acts. Compare
People v. Thousand, 631 N.W.2d 694 (Mich. 2001) (finding a defendant who sent an obscene picture
to an undercover policeman guilty of distribution of obscene material to a minor; impossibility not a
relevant defense), with Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 A. 344 (Pa. 1933) (finding defendant who
attempted murder via voodoo not guilty by reason of inherent impossibility). Assuming defendants
can convince the court to allow impossibility as a defense, the argument would have to be something
like that the traders might have well been practicing voodoo, because given the economic
environment, there was no way they could have manipulated prices.
142
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Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at § I.A, Edison Fund, 551 F.
Supp. 2d 210 (No. 06 Civ. 4045(JGK)).
144

145

Edison Fund, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 225.

182

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 11

show that the defendants misrepresented the risk of an investment about which the
defendants had a duty to stay current. 146
6. Passing the Blame
A final lesson to be learned by hedge fund defendants is that they cannot
insulate themselves from liability by making material misrepresentations through
third parties. In S.E.C. v. Trabulse,147 the SEC alleged that the defendant provided,
among other things, account statements and newsletters containing material
misrepresentations to third parties for distribution to potential investors. The
defendant argued that he did not make the statement personally or exercise control
over what was said, but this flatly contradicted the facts the SEC alleged.148 The
court ruled summarily that the defendant „„cannot escape liability simply because it
carried out its alleged fraud through the public statements of third parties.”149
IV. C O N C L U S I O N S
This article examined the universe of federal judgments on motions to
dismiss hedge fund fraud complaints to determine why courts sometimes dismiss
fraud complaints against hedge fund companies, and other times reject defendants‟
arguments for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs state insufficient claims when
they frame their complaints conclusorily, wait too long to file their complaints, and
forget to sue for an accounting before bringing their fraud complaint. Defendants
misguidedly bring a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when they debate facts, raise irrelevancies,
ignore contract provisions, fail to raise an impossibility defense, ignore a failure to
stay current regarding risk, or unmeritoriously pass the blame to a third party
through which it has acted.
The universe of precedent is small, but this article suggested two emerging
themes in the case law. First, although the form of the defendant‟s argument in a
motion to dismiss should not appear to debate alleged facts, there is indeed room to
debate whether the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to . . . nudge[ ] [his or her]
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 150 And sometimes winning this
debate means providing additional facts. Defendants should not be shy in providing
economic analysis in their briefs supporting motions to dismiss if doing so can show
that the plaintiffs allege no facts to support fraud. This method of destroying the
146
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plausibility of plaintiffs‟ assertions with economic arguments proved successful in
Collier, for example. 151 By the same rationale, providing economic counterarguments,
if available, might prove useful in future cases with issues similar to those in
CompuDyne 152 and the Amaranth cases153 by showing an inability to manipulate prices;
or to those in Heller154 by showing that the fund‟s advertised investment would have
sustained greater or equal losses than did the alleged fraudulent investment.
A second common theme running throughout the cases, related to the first
point, is that loss causation is the fuzziest element to prove, with much creative
maneuvering available to adept and economically proficient lawyers. 155 In a
depressed economy, it may be difficult to determine whether a hedge fund‟s
investments declined due to fraud or instead due to systemic economic forces. Yet
hedge fund claims may increase accordingly, on the theory presented in Edison Fund,
that hedge funds have a duty to update their offering documents amidst economic
crises lest investors feel defrauded by the fund‟s sustained optimism. 156 In these
cases it may be all too easy to allege loss causation, especially since loss causation is
not subject to Rule 9(b)‟s heightened pleading requirements in some courts,157 just as
it was all too easy for plaintiffs to allege exclusionary conduct in antitrust cases
before Twombly. Plaintiffs should take note before alleging loss causation without
any factual basis that as these claims increase and ultimately lose because plaintiffs
cannot prove loss causation at trial, courts may increasingly require more specific
allegations at the pleading stage as Twombly mandated for exclusionary conduct in
antitrust cases, Iqbal required for discrimination in suits against government officials,
and some courts have already begun requiring for loss causation in securities fraud
cases.158 Defendants would be wise to emphasize this point as much as possible on
motions to dismiss, and buttress the argument with alternative loss causation
theories supported by economic data to destroy the plausibility of plaintiffs‟ claims.
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